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Abstract 
The EU's view of decentralization in regional development policy has made a sharp U-turn since the 
1990s. The earlier emphasis on the strengthening of local developmental agency in the accession 
countries has been replaced by renewed enthusiasim for centralization. One justification for this turn is 
that decentralization amplifies fiscal imbalances, encouraging excessive borrowing at the local level, 
thus undermining the overall fiscal stability. Drawing on the in-depth study of one such case – the 
rapid accumulation of municipal debt in Montenegro – this paper makes several arguments against 
such a simplistic view. First, the fiscal opportunism and soft budget constraints that fuelled the debt 
crisis have been spurred on not by decentralization, but by partial decentralization, i.e. the ambiguous 
division of powers between levels of government. Second, while most corrective measures proposed 
by international advisors focus on the behaviour of local authorities, fiscal imbalances at the 
subnational level are just as likely to be fomented by the opportunism of the central government. This 
suggests that re-centralization is unlikely to ensure fiscal consolidation, and may even be counter-
productive. A more promising strategy would be to strengthen the competencies and competences of 
local authorities, clearly delineating their developmental responsibilities and improving their capacity 
to exercise them.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Decentralization has had a turbulent career over the past twenty years. Nearly a universal policy 
prescription in the late 1980s and 1990s, in more recent years it has visibly fallen out of favour among 
international policy advisors. In its heyday, decentralization, understood loosely as some form of 
devolution of power from the central to local level governments, was expected to bring a multitude of 
benefits, from the enhancement of political accountability and civic engagement to greater ownership 
of development projects, efficient allocation of resources and improved delivery of services (Oates 
1972; Breton 1998; Burki et al. 1999). As a tool of the EU's regional development policy, 
decentralized management of EU funds also carried the added political benefit of undercutting 
national governments' monopoly on development projects and increasing the visibility of (and loyalty 
to) the EU at the local level. And as part of the enlargement policy towards East European countries, it 
was also expected to bolster democratization by countering the debilitating legacies of state socialism, 
such as the overly hierarchical decision making, lack of initiative and clientelism (Bird et al. 1995). In 
the post-conflict societies of the Western Balkans, decentralization was even supposed to help 
alleviate inter-ethnic tensions, and as such was often formally integrated into the peace agreements 
(Mojsovska 2011). 
By the mid-2000s, however, these conventional wisdoms about decentralization had been all 
but turned upside down (Bruszt 2008). Within the EU, the turn was fuelled by the Lisbon Agenda's 
renewed emphasis on competitiveness and economic growth, which increasingly overshadowed the 
other aim of the Cohesion Policy: redistribution and "reducing the backwardness of the least favoured 
regions" (TFEU 2012 (1958), Art. 174). Competitiveness required instead directing the funds towards 
regions and activities with the highest growth potential – ensuring, in other words, the greatest return 
on the EU's developmental investments –  and this improved efficiency in the use of funds was to be 
achieved through greater centralization of the funds' management. One of the reasons that the 
insistence on efficiency went hand in hand with recentralization was the mounting evidence that the 
much touted benefits of multi-level governance only manifested in the regions that already possessed 
the institutional capabilities to take on the responsibility for local development (Börzel 2002; Bailey & 
De Propris 2002). In the new eastern member states in particular, the increased reliance on centralized 
planning and implementation structures was widely justified by the fact that the subnational 
governments lacked the "absorption capacity" – were, in other words, too administratively or 
financially weak, incompetent or corrupt to be trusted with the EU monies (Hughes et al. 2004).  
The focus on efficiency has only been strengthened in the recent crisis, which added worries 
about spending to the concerns over growth. The imperative of fiscal consolidation, both in the net 
contributors and in the net recipients of EU funds, has further reduced the patience with any 
potentially wasteful practices involved in the support of less developed regions. The backlash against 
local autonomy has been all the greater in those member states and enlargement countries in which the 
local governments contributed to the debt problems by taking part in the excessive borrowing of the 
pre-crisis years (Colino et al. 2014; Bohle 2015).  
The combination of the weakening enthusiasm for the devolution of power to the subnational 
actors within the EU, and the weakness of local government units in the accession states means that 
decentralization has been all but eliminated from the battery of the EU's developmental policies 
towards enlargement countries. But while a more critical appraisal of the absorption capacities and 
appropriateness of allocating specific functions to local governments might be a welcome corrective to 
the optimism of the early years, this paper argues that abandoning all attempts to strengthen multi-
level governance in the accession countries would be a mistake.  
First, even if the responsibility for local development is transferred back to the central 
authorities, many EU policies that are to be transposed to the future member states – especially those 
in the domain of environmental protection – require capable actors at the local level. To be sure, there 
are limits to what the EU can do to empower subnational actors. As decentralization was never an 
explicit part of the EU acquis, and could not be, given the variety of power-sharing configurations 
between different levels of government in the "old" EU members, the Commission could not require 
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the accession countries to comply with a particular type of institutional solution. What it could do, 
however, was offer resources for capacity-building at the local level, create bottom-up developmental 
coalitions, and provide them with "practice" funding to implement local projects (Bruszt 2008). While 
the capabilities of thus upgraded local structures may still fall short of the optimum "absorption 
capacity", research shows that extensive EU pre-accession assistance is associated with greater post-
accession developmental agency (Bruszt & Vedres 2013).  
Second, some form of decentralization has already been implemented in most accession states, 
and without sufficient investment in institution building these partial transfers of power could turn out 
to be a source of significant economic risk (see also Asatryan et al. 2015). Calls for the greater 
concentration of authority in the hard times underestimate the appeal that decentralization holds for 
central governments, in absolving them of some of the responsibility and cost of developmental 
efforts. Many accession countries have eagerly embraced the EU's competitive development model, 
pushing onto their local governments the responsibility for improving infrastructure and attracting 
investment. Without adequate support or resources, this process exposes local authorities to the 
powerful market forces that they are eminently incapable of handling. 
This paper makes the case that it is precisely such unsupervised, partial decentralization that 
leads to the types of fiscal risk the EU is trying to avoid, and that more control by the central 
government may not have the expected positive effect on financial consolidation. To show this 
mechanism in action, the paper explores the case of Montenegro, currently the most advanced of the 
enlargement countries. 
Montenegro illustrates well the paradox of partial decentralization. On the one hand, partly 
due to its small size, Montenegro is one of the most centralized countries on the European continent, 
with local government spending accounting for less than 5% of the GDP. Local government finances 
are also tightly regulated – their budgets are regularly monitored by the Ministry of Finance, and their 
borrowing capacity is limited by the rule that the overall debt obligations in a given year must not 
exceed 10% of revenues1. Even within this limit, each loan must receive written approval by the 
Ministry of Finance, and can only be taken in support of a capital investment project already planned 
by a multi-annual capital budget2. Nevertheless, Montenegrin local governments managed to ramp up 
an impressive amount of debt, by far the highest among all the accession countries. By the end of 
2014, the total amount owed by the Montenegrin municipalities reached € 170 million, or 4.8% of the 
country's GDP. It was also done in record time: just seven years earlier, in 2006, municipal debt stood 
at a mere € 34 million, about 1.5% of the GDP. The response to this debt explosion has been to reduce 
local financial autonomy even further, imposing rigorous controls by central government on the 
financing and employment practices at the local level. Although the move has been heartily welcomed 
by the European Commission (EC 2015), the findings of this paper suggest that this will not remedy 
the root problem, and may not even prevent expansion of debt in the medium term. Limited capacities 
and corruption at the local level certainly contributed to the unsustainable expansion of public 
finances, but its main driver has been the combination of a competitive development model and 
opportunistic decentralization policy pursued by the central government. As long as both remain 
fundamental features of the Montenegrin regional development policy, tightening control of local 
public finances will only add to the worsening economic conditions in times of crisis, while doing 
little to prevent risky financial behaviour by all levels of government once the conditions improve. A 
far more effective, though arguably painstaking solution, would be to return to the policy of capacity 
building at the local level, while ensuring a clearer delineation of responsibilities between different 
levels of government. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes how partial decentralization obfuscated 
the lines of accountability between different levels of government and, in combination with the 
pressure to raise large funds required for the country's economic transformation, led to an 
opportunistic approach to borrowing. The consequences of this arrangement – the escalation of 
                                                      
1 This is one of the lowest local debt ceilings in the Western Balkans (NALAS 2010), well below the 30% threshold in 
Macedonia, 20% in Albania and 15% in Croatia and Serbia.  
2 Law on the Financing of Local Self-Governments, 2015 (2003, 2008). 
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subnational debt and the measures to restore fiscal balance by curbing local autonomy – are analysed 
in Section 3. Section 4 then discusses the EU's support programmes to local governments in 
Montenegro, and argues that they offered a promising corrective to the problems of partial 
decentralization, but were unfortunately abandoned before they could make a significant impact. The 
final section makes the case for the return to a regionalization policy in the accession states, and offers 
some suggestions on the ways in which it could be made more effective.  
 
Competitive developmentalism and opportunistic decentralization in the good times 
 
Background: The ambiguous division of powers 
Unlike most state socialist countries, the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was in fact a highly 
decentralized country. Subnational governments were organised around relatively large municipalities 
which carried out a broad range of social and economic functions, and in the 1980s accounted for as 
much as 40% of total government consumption. After the fall of socialism, Montenegro preserved the 
same territorial organisation3, but like most of the other post-Yugoslav republics it pursued policies 
that concentrated powers in the hands of the republican government (Sevic 2001). It was not until the 
early 2000s that the first attempts were made to restore a certain level of autonomy to the 
municipalities, with the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government (2002) and the Law on the 
Financing of Local Self-Government (2003).  The two acts were drafted with active involvement of 
foreign experts and donors, and reflected the contemporary international enthusiasm for multi-level 
governance, but were initially met with reluctance on the part of the Montenegrin central authorities. 
So much so, in fact, that just before the Law on Local Self Government was to be adopted, the 
government replaced the draft carefully crafted in months of consultations with foreign experts and 
local representatives with its own version. The move was not only a procedural snub at the principles 
of partnership between different levels of government, but also offered far less devolution of power 
than originally envisaged. External experts protested, and after a stern intervention by the USAID, the 
original draft was brought back. The law that finally came into force in 2003 brought, in the words of 
the American consultants, "a sea change in how power and resources are allocated between the 
republic and the local level in Montenegro" (ICMA 2002).  
On paper at least, the two laws indeed provided generous resources to the local governments 
to carry out their assigned functions. Own resources comprised a variety of taxes, such as the property 
tax, special taxes for unused agricultural and construction land and, from 2004 onwards, taxes on 
company name or trademark, a surcharge on the personal income tax and taxes on games of chance. 
An even larger chunk of income was to come from various fees for local administrative and communal 
services and charges for the use of communal property (public roads, construction land, access to 
communal infrastructure). Own sources were further supplemented by a share of nationally-collected 
taxes on personal incomes, real estate sales tax, motor vehicle charges and charges for the use of 
natural resources located on the territory of the respective municipality4. Finally, the Equalization 
Fund was set up to redistribute resources to poorer municipalities in order to close the gaps in fiscal 
capacity and ensure their budgetary needs were met. The Law on Local Self-Governments guaranteed 
autonomy in the execution of budgetary decisions and management of municipal property, and the 
latter was further strengthened by the 2004 Law on State Property that delineated more clearly the 
ownership rights over state property between the central and local governments.  
                                                      
3 Until 2013, the structure consisted of a single-tier of 21 municipalities. Most recently (2013) two additional municipalities 
were established as spin-offs from larger units. 
4 The 2003 law allocated to the municipalities 10% share of personal income tax, 50% of the tax on real estate sales, and 30% 
of the charges for the use of natural resources collected on its territory (Official Journal of the Republic of Montenegro 
42/2003, Art. 25-28). Amendments in 2008 and 2010 added to this revenues from the charges on registration of motor 
vehicles and 30% of the charge for the use of motor vehicles and their trailers (eco charge), and increased the local 
governments' shares of other shared taxes to 12% for PIT, 80% for the real estate sales tax and 70% for the charge on the 
use of natural resources.  
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It quickly became apparent, however, that not all of these resources were "real", as the local 
governments lacked the capacity or even the legal authority to collect them to any meaningful degree. 
Probably the best example are the taxes on unused agricultural land that were introduced by the 2003 
Law but have never been collected as the Montenegrin law provides no definition of what constitutes 
"unused" land and thus no grounds for such charges (Union of Municipalities of Montenegro 2013). A 
more recent version of the Law on the Financing of Local Self-Governments (2008) and the Law on 
Environment (2008) created a similar conundrum with the "charge for the protection of environment" 
that local governments are allowed to introduce "according to their needs and specificities". As no 
legal definition exists of the appropriate "needs and specificities", an attempt in 2010 by the 
municipality of Pljevlja to introduce this charge was promptly struck down by the Constitutional 
Court. Subsequent attempts by other municipalities to find ways of exploiting this provision proved 
similarly futile, and the clause has been rendered practically inapplicable by the 2010 Law on the 
Improvement of Business Environment (UNECE 2015).  
Revenues from property taxes proved almost equally elusive, albeit for a different reason. The 
law requires local governments to levy the tax according to the property's market value, but with 
incomplete registers, weak enforcement mechanisms and without centrally provided valuations for 
most regions and types of property, it took nearly another decade for this tax to become a significant 
source of income5. The situation is even worse with the charges for the commercial exploitation of 
natural resources (ores, stone, wood, beaches etc.) that are to be paid on the basis of concession 
agreements with private operators. Although the resources are nominally the property of local 
governments, the agreements with third parties are usually arranged by central authorities. Local 
governments are entitled to a share of the revenues, but often do not even have access to these 
contracts, let alone any control over the enforcement of payments, which is notoriously ineffective 
(Marović 2014; Parliament of Montenegro 2015). 
Probably the most jarring from the point of view of local authorities, however, is the habit of 
the central government to push through secondary laws and directives that effectively cancel sources 
of income guaranteed by the systemic Law on the Financing of Local Self-Governments. Most of 
these have been done in the name of "abolishing business barriers", i.e. to lower the costs of doing 
business and encourage private investment. From the point of view of local authorities, however, these 
not only take away their own prerogative to bargain with investors by waving or reducing local 
charges, but can also seriously affect the stability of local budgets. Probably the most significant from 
this point of view has been the decisions to abolish the charge for the use of construction land in order 
to create an extra boost for the construction sectors (Amendments to the Law on Spatial Development 
and Construction, 2009). The same law offered additional incentives by moving the payment of the 
charge for the provision of communal infrastructure from the beginning to the end of the investment 
cycle and by waving it altogether for the construction of "objects of general public interest" – 
including four- and five-star hotels and any establishment promising to employ 50 or more persons. 
The combined effect of regulatory changes and the collapse of the real estate bubble in 2009-2010 had 
been to reduce the income from these two charges alone from € 120 million in 2008 – almost a half of 
total budgetary income of local governments – to € 35 million in 20116.  
None of this is to say that the Montenegrin local governments are in particularly dire 
economic circumstances. More recent amendments to the Law on the Financing of Local Self 
Governments (2010, 2015) attempted to compensate for some of the losses incurred through lower-
                                                      
5 Much of the progress was due to the World Bank-led Land Administration and Management Project (LAMP, 2008-2015), 
which helped to improve access to the real estate records through a unified information system and complete the cadastre 
(including extensive re-surveying of land, especially in the north of the country).  
6 Efforts to improve the business environment through amendments to sectoral laws also eliminated other 
sources of revenue such as the charge for the use of local roads (Law on Roads, 2010), charge for the use of 
facilities for power transmission, telecommunications, TV and radio transmitters and the use of seashore for 
commercial purposes (Law on Local Communal Fees, 2008), and the charge for the use of motor vehicles 
and trailers (eco-charge) (Regulation on pollution charges, 2011). 
 
EU Regional Development Policy 
5 
level legislative changes by expanding their participation in shared taxes, and a decade of efforts to put 
the property registries in order has rendered the property tax a more reliable source of funding. But the 
issues listed above are illustrative of two larger problems that have pushed Montenegro's partially 
decentralized system into a cycle of rapid debt accumulation. The first is a development model that is 
committed to attracting private investment capital by providing the best possible business 
environment. What this means in practice is that public authorities are expected – often in competition 
with one another – to ensure quality infrastructure for private enterprises while reducing their costs in 
the provision of these general goods as much as possible. The second is a form of decentralization 
that, while insisting on the transfer of certain functions to the sub-national government, leaves the 
actual contours of the division of powers highly ambiguous. The uncertainty caused by whimsical 
legislative changes and the vaguely defined rights and responsibilities of different levels of 
government opens up space for what can best be described as "opportunistic decentralization", where 
both sides engage in financially risky behaviour, confident that if the payday came they could always 
pass the bill to the other party. A temptation at the best of times, when combined with the vertiginous 
investment boom of the late 2000s and the political exuberance of a newly minted country, this 
arrangement practically guaranteed that fiscal prudence would be thrown to the winds. 
 
The investment imperative and opportunistic decentralization 
As noted in the introduction, Montenegrin local governments have comparatively few competencies, 
as they are not responsible for health, education or social policy, which claim most of the revenues of 
their counterparts elsewhere in the region (NALAS 2012). They are, however, expected to carry out 
two major functions that have been rendered disproportionally burdensome by the circumstances of 
Montenegro's economic transition: they act as employers of last resort, and are in charge of upgrading 
the country's outdated communal infrastructure. 
The first is especially true of the poorer northern municipalities. Despite its small size, 
Montenegro suffers from marked regional disparities: the centre of the country, with the capital city 
that is home to around 1/3 of the country's population, and the increasingly prosperous coast, attracted 
the majority of recent investment in the growth sectors: real estate, tourism and other services. The 
mountainous north, by contrast, is still largely rural, with its few urban centres clustered around 
declining traditional industries and suffering from a dearth of investment, high unemployment and 
steady depopulation (Bartlett & Šišević 2013).  In 2014, the average unemployment rate in the north 
was 37.1% – nearly three times as high as in the central region (13.3%) and six times higher than on 
the coast (6.4%)7. Public administration dominates the employment landscape – in 7 out of 11 northern 
municipalities it is the leading sector of activity, and overall it accounts for about 20% of total 
employment in this region, compared to the national average of about 15%8. Although the 
phenomenon is most pronounced in the poorer provinces, the combination of limited employment 
opportunities in the private sector and political clientelism have resulted in a bloated local public 
administration across the country, in some cases severely weighing down local public finances 
(Pradelli et al. 2015). 
It is, however, the second task that poses the real challenge to the limited budgets of municipal 
authorities. Montenegro had been one of the poorest republics of former Yugoslavia, and even though 
it escaped direct devastation in the Yugoslav wars, a decade of sanctions and severing of economic 
links to the other former republics left its economy significantly worse off. Following the fall of 
Milošević in Serbia and the subsequent thaw between the international community and the rump 
federation to which Montenegro still belonged, the smaller republic plunged into feverish reform 
activity in the hope of leveraging the good will of international financial institutions to relaunch its 
economy. The first comprehensive plan, known as the Economic Reform Agenda for 2002-2007 was 
drafted with the assistance of USAID and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), and 
included additional input from the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, and numerous bilateral donors. The 
document contained the usual litany of general tasks assigned to all transition economies – 
                                                      
7 Montenegro's Statistical Office (MONSTAT) Labour Force Survey. 
8 Data from 2011 Census of the Montenegrin Statistical Office. Includes employment in communal services. 
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liberalization, privatization, measures to attract private investment and increase competitiveness – but 
also spelled the specific objective of the Montenegrin government to steer the economy away from 
traditional heavy industries and towards services, especially tourism  (Government of Montenegro 
2002). 
One obstacle to this ambitious shift was the severe state of disrepair of the country's 
infrastructure. This was true both of the key transport links that provided access to foreign visitors – 
the railway and airports – as well as of the internal roads and basic communal infrastructure. A survey 
by the World Bank in 2008 classified about half of Montenegrin local roads as "poor" (World Bank 
2005); another study on the country's competitiveness potential found the tourist industry to be 
strongly constrained by failures to provide adequate water and waste management services (World 
Bank 2005). According to the 2002 environmental performance review of Montenegro by the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe, only 42% of household waste was collected by municipal waste 
management companies, many of which lacked sufficient vehicles and equipment. While the 
uncollected waste ended up in "wild" dumps or in rivers, the survey found the registered municipal 
landfills to be little better – without any separation, treatment, or prevention of air or groundwater 
pollution, not a single one of these dumps met international sanitary standards. The situation was 
similar with regard to the treatment of waste water; with only one waste water treatment plant in 
operation in the capital city, the rest would simply be pumped into the nearest body of water, 
compromising the quality of surface waters in the tourist-hopeful coastal municipalities. Many of these 
municipalities also suffered acute water shortages in the summer, when the demand peaked because of 
the increased number of visitors (UNECE 2003).  
The economic imperative to upgrade the country's infrastructure was further reinforced by the 
need to adapt to EU environmental requirements once the start of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process confirmed – however distant – hopes of eventual membership of the EU. The original 
Economic Reform Agenda was revised in 2005 with the EU's assistance, giving even more weight to 
the support of economic growth through public investment and the focus on sustainable tourism and 
rural development. Accompanying it were a series of laws that aligned Montenegrin legal system with 
EU environmental directives9, as well the more specific development plans for individual sectors: the 
2004 Master Plan for Water Supply for Coastal Regions of Montenegro and Cetinje, the 2005 
Strategic Master Plan for Sewage and Waste Waters for Central and North Regions, and the 2005 
Strategic Master Plan for Solid Waste Management. Together, the three documents laid out plans for 
infrastructural improvements carrying a combined price tag of € 600 million, a third of which was to 
be invested in the following 4-5 years. Although the responsibility for maintenance and investment 
into communal infrastructure belonged in theory to municipal authorities, there was little hope that 
such major undertakings could be covered from their current revenues, or even from the national 
capital budget. Instead, the Government of Montenegro closed the financing gap by contracting large 
framework loans with the international financial institutions, including the International Development 
Agency (IDA), the funding arm of the World Bank, the German Development Bank (KfW) and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB).   
It soon turned out, however, that the municipalities would indeed play a major role in 
shouldering the country's large investment burden, and in two distinct ways. The first is the 
quintessential reflection of what I dubbed "opportunistic decentralization", and consists of the 
Government of Montenegro simply passing on the responsibility for paying back these loans to the 
municipal authorities. This approach may not be financially unsound, as international development 
banks offer countries like Montenegro loans on terms that would be impossible for municipalities to 
obtain on their own, from the same institutions or elsewhere. But the manner in which these loans 
have been passed on has served to diffuse accountability of both central and local governments, a 
problem that has become increasingly evident as the deadlines for payments begin to fall due. First, 
the municipalities had practically no influence on project identification and planning. Most of the 
                                                      
9  These included the Law  on  Environmental  Impact  Assessment (2005), the Law on Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(2005), the Law on Integrated  Pollution  Prevention  Control (2005), the  Law  on  Waste  Management (2005) and the 
Law on Environmental Noise (2006).   
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projects have already been drawn up under the Ministry of Sustainable Development's Master Plans, 
and only minor alterations could be suggested by the local governments. They also have no say over 
the implementation of these projects, which is handled by a Government-founded public works 
company Project Consulting (ProCon). This means that the only element that is being "decentralized" 
in this configuration is the cost of paying back the loans. As if this weren't enough to dampen the sense 
of ownership and accountability of local governments, the transfer of loans is often ambiguous and 
suggests soft budget constraints. The best illustration is probably the bizarre spat that recently erupted 
in the Montenegrin media between the Ministry of Finance and the municipality of Danilovgrad after 
the Ministry declared that the municipality owed € 0.7 million to foreign creditors, prompting furious 
denials from local authorities (Dan 2015). The amount turned out to be the first disbursement of a € 
5.4 million loan which the Ministry of Finance contracted with the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) in late 2010 for the construction of a water treatment plant and 
reconstruction of the water and sewage network in the Municipality of Danilovgrad. Four years later 
and a few months into the start of the works, no contract had been signed with the Municipality 
specifying the terms of financing, and while the local authorities assumed that the Government would 
be paying for it, the Government insisted that it was merely loaning the money to the municipality 
(Government of Montenegro 2015a)  
Even in cases where written agreements exist between the municipal and central authorities, 
the terms of the transfers have often proven to be malleable to negotiation. In the first three phases of a 
major reconstruction project of  water and sewage networks on the Adriatic Coast, which has been 
running since 2004, the funds borrowed from the German KfW had been passed on to the five 
participating municipalities as loans (about € 40 million). In 2009, however, the Government ruled 
that the accumulated debt obligations of these municipalities already exceeded the legal borrowing 
limit and disbursed the funding for the fourth phase of the project – around € 25 million – as grants. 
Phase V of the project began in 2015, with a fresh round of loans from KfW contracted in December 
2014, but by mid-2015 the Government of Montenegro had not yet decided whether the newly raised € 
36 million will be passed on as grants or loans (Government of Montenegro 2015a). There seems to be 
no general rule guiding these decisions: in some cases, municipalities under financial stress have 
managed to renegotiate transfer agreements reducing their obligation and converting parts of their 
loans into grants10, while in other cases the government simply waved the legally prescribed municipal 
borrowing limit to allow them to take on more debt11. 
The practice of  "parking" international loans with municipal authorities was not, however, the 
only way in which the Montenegrin local governments expanded their debt portfolios in the good 
years. Many of them embarked on capital investment projects of their own, emboldened by rising 
revenues from the real estate boom. Some of these projects were simply overdue interventions in the 
aged communal spaces – renovations of schools, community centres and local streets and squares. 
Others were at least partly pushed on by the larger government-sponsored investments, which charged 
municipalities with financing some aspects of the project (e.g. covering expropriation of land on their 
territory for the construction of inter-city transport links). The central government certainly did 
everything to encourage additional investment activity, going so far as to launch, in 2006, an 
experiment in municipal debt financing involving the creation of a market for municipal bonds. 
Between 2006 and 2009, 16 municipalities issued bonds for communal infrastructure projects, raising 
in total about € 14 million, but the market never took off, and all bonds were purchased by the 
Montenegrin Investment and Development Fund.  Part of the reason might have been that the 
                                                      
10 In 2006, Ministry of Finance and the Municipality of Budva signed the Loan transfer agreement according to 
which the Municipality took on the responsibility for paying back a small part of the 10.000.000 euro loan 
from KfW (about € 0.7 million). The agreement was amended two years later, further reducing the 
municipality's share to just € 0.1 mn (State Audit Institution 2015). 
11 In December 2014, Ministry of Finance approved transfer of another loan of € 4.2 mn to the Municipality of Nikšić to 
continue works on the water treatment plant and reconstruction of the sewer system in the municipality (phase 3 of an 
arrangement started with EIB in 2008), even though the municipality had already exceeded the borrowing limit by over 
100% (Government of Montenegro 2014a; Municipality of Nikšić 2014)..  
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commercial bank loans offered an all too easy alternative: as foreign investment flooded the country in 
the mid-2000s, fierce competition among banks in the tiny Montenegrin market boosted the lending 
volume and pushed the interest rates to record lows12. 
None of this helped to harden the municipal governments' budget constraints; on the contrary, 
it probably encouraged behaviours that were at least opportunistic and in some cases outright criminal. 
The media is rife with accusations of corruption and over-payment in various local undertakings, and 
the State Audit Institution confirmed violations of the Law on Public Procurement in 10 out of 12 
municipal audits conducted between 2007 and 2014. Probably the most notorious is the case of the 
municipality of Budva, which in 2010 took a € 58 million loan from the German company WTE 
Wassertechnik  GmbH for the construction of a waste water treatment plant, despite the protests of the 
opposition councillors who pointed out that having the same company as the creditor, the project 
designer and the executor opened up too much space for manipulation (RTB 2010b; RTB 2010a). In 
2015, several former members of the municipal government were indeed arrested on charges of having 
embezzled at least € 8 million through this deal. It remains unclear, however, why central government 
allowed the municipality to enter this arrangement in the first place. WTE Wassertechnik had already 
been contracted to construct water treatment facilities in other coastal municipalities, all of them under 
the Government's Master Plan for Water Supply on the Adriatic Coast, which had been financed for 
years from the KfW framework loans on significantly better terms. And yet, the Government not only 
allowed the municipality to take on the more expensive loan without questioning its soundness, 
despite the fact that Budva's outstanding debt obligations already approached 40% of its revenues – 
nearly four times the legal borrowing limit (see Municipality of Budva 2011) – but even agreed to 
cover a part of this loan by a state guarantee worth € 29 million.  
 
The crisis and the municipal debt explosion 
As we have seen above, the vague and negotiable division of responsibilities between the central and 
local governments in Montenegro encouraged soft budget constraints and opportunistic behaviour on 
both sides. But what truly catalysed this casual attitude to debt was the unprecedented economic boom 
that swept the country between 2005 and 2009. Foreign investment soared. In the first four years of 
the century, foreign direct investment inflows in the country amounted to a little more than € 170 
million; in 2005 alone, they reached over twice that amount, and continued to rise vertiginously for the 
next few years. Investments in real estate accounted for a large chunk of these flows, especially in the 
years 2006-2008 when they made up nearly half of all foreign investment in the country (Figure 1). 
This in turn buoyed up the budgets of local governments, much of whose income is legally tied to real 
estate and construction13, with the total revenues rising  from less than € 100 million in 2005 to nearly 
350 million in 2008.  
Expenditure also rose, but in a country suddenly so awash in money nobody took this as a 
cause for concern. As the GDP grew at an average pace of 7% a year, and the central government used 
some of the surplus to pay off the old debt obligations, the debt-to-GDP ratio actually declined from 
over 40% in 2004 to well under 30% in 2008, even as the country continued to accumulate new loans. 
At the local level, however, the situation was not so rosy. Municipal spending grew apace with 
revenue, and even in 2008, the peak year of the revenue boom, 14 out of 21 municipalities  recorded a 
primary budget deficit. These could only partially be offset by the sales of municipal property, and 
about half of all municipalities had to rely on loans to cover the financing gap. Nevertheless, this was 
"good" spending; capital investment took up nearly a half of the municipal budgets, and even if some 
of it was wasteful, most local governments could point to significant improvements in local 
infrastructure, transport and business environment. It was only once the burst of the real estate and 
capital bubble brought the economy to a halt that what everybody hoped would be the engine of 
growth turned into a spiralling debt nightmare.  
                                                      
12 Between 2005 and 2008 the cumulative lending volume increased by more than 900% (IMF 2013). 
13 Despite the changes in the structure of fees and charges, and in the collection and distribution of tax revenues, the 
combined revenues from construction-related charges, real estate ownership and sales tax and sales of municipal property 
have accounted for 50% to 2/3 of all municipal revenues between 2005 and 2010. 
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The crisis arrived in Montenegro in 2009, striking down several of the economy's pillars at 
once. Construction, hospitality and real estate services experienced a combined output loss of over 
30% and overall the country's GDP shrunk by almost 6%. The total volume of foreign investment 
actually increased, but most of it went to beef up the reserves of the teetering Montenegrin affiliates of 
West European banks, some of which had all but ceased lending activity due to collapsing deposits 
and rapid accumulation of non-performing loans (CBCG 2011; Bartlett & Šišević 2013). Elsewhere, 
the investments were quickly drying up: between 2008 and 2009, the amount of foreign investment 
going to the real estate purchases fell by a half (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Trends in foreign investment and local government revenues, 2003-2014 
 
 
The effect on the municipal budgets was immediate. Revenues shrank for three consecutive years, 
bottoming out in 2011 at € 210 million – almost 40% down on the 2008 peak. Clearly unable to reduce 
expenditure at the same rate, some municipalities resorted to emergency loans to plug the holes in 
their budgets, often at very high interest rates. Others simply stopped paying their bills: the 
accumulated arrears of Montenegrin local governments jumped from € 27 million in 2008 to nearly € 
100 million in 2011, and in the past few years at least a quarter of them had their bank accounts 
blocked by court order as a result of various claimants seeking forced repayment. 
In the already familiar twist, the financial collapse was quickly turned into a morality tale. 
Local authorities have been accused of everything from incompetence to profligacy and corruption, 
and some have found themselves in the hands of criminal investigators. While some of this is 
undoubtedly well deserved, the larger question remains whether the more recent legal and institutional 
interventions into Montenegro's semi-decentralized system can be counted on to prevent such 
behaviour in the future. 
The recommendations of the well-meaning foreign observers have so far mostly centred on 
the need to reduce local government spending, above all by cutting the wage bill, and to increase 
oversight by central authorities (Pradelli et al. 2015; EC 2015). Although some of these measures 
might help to tighten the budget constraints of local governments – though mostly in the short run – I 
argue that they nevertheless leave completely unresolved the problem that has led to opportunistic debt 
accumulation in the first place: the ambiguous division of responsibilities between government levels, 
and the political convenience of blame shifting that this ambiguity accords.  
The most comprehensive measure introduced so far to restore fiscal prudence at the local level 
has been the 2014 Law on the Budget and Fiscal Responsibility, which requires all municipal budgets 
to be submitted to the Ministry of Finance for approval before they can be adopted. Though laudable 
from the point of view of greater transparency, this form of ex-ante monitoring does little to prevent 
fiscal failures arising from over-optimistic budgeting, and it conspicuously lacks a credible 
enforcement mechanism. This makes it very similar to the 10% borrowing ceiling that was  supposed 
to prevent the excessive debt growth of the previous years. A retrospective analysis of municipal 
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budgets shows that between 2008 and 2012, nearly all municipalities that took on new loans did so in 
violation of this limitation, without incurring sanctions. It is unclear whether the failure of central 
government to react was a consequence of incomplete information, tacit agreement or explicit 
approval – the reasons possibly varied from one case to another – but it is clear that if for several years 
half or more Montenegrin municipalities could safely disregard a fiscal constraint based on ex ante 
budget monitoring, another of the same kind is unlikely to be more effective. It is symptomatic that a 
number of measures launched with much pomp in 2014 as a way of putting local public finances in 
order consisted simply of reiterating the existing rules – such as instructing the Tax Administration to 
"apply, as of 01.01.2015, legal measures against all municipalities that pay employees net salaries 
without taxes and contributions", as if that were not one of the Tax Administration's core functions 
(Government of Montenegro 2014b).  
All of this suggests that to really ensure fiscal prudence at the local level it is not enough to 
simply impose stricter control of municipalities. It is also necessary to create binding devices that 
prevent the central authorities from using these rules arbitrarily and at their own convenience, while 
shifting the blame to local actors when necessary. One approach might indeed be to restrict the 
autonomy of local governments further,  but in this case financial accountability should also be firmly 
shifted to the central authorities, alongside responsibility for the execution of essential local functions. 
Another approach – perhaps counter-intuitively – would be to increase the autonomy of local actors. 
This would also mean that central government would on the one hand refrain from piling new duties 
on them without agreement or consultation, and on the other refuse to foot the bill in case of 
overspending. As it stands, the most recent solutions to the problem of municipal over-indebtedness 
promise to do neither, continuing, in the guise of rigorous oversight, the same tradition of partial and 
ambiguous decentralization.  
 
Figure 2. Changes in employment and arrears in local governments in the years of "fiscal 
tightening" 
 
 
The case in point is the so-called "financial restructuring contracts" signed between the Ministry of 
Finance and the most financially distressed municipalities. These are meant to facilitate several forms 
of debt restructuring: rescheduling tax arrears  or waving debt ceilings so that over-indebted 
municipalities can take on fresh commercial loans, sometimes with government guarantees, in order to 
refinance debt. In exchange, the municipalities promise to reduce spending and excess employment, 
refrain from accumulating further arrears, and obtain the Ministry's permission for each new loan, 
budgetary change or new employee. The programme began in 2010 and has thus far proved to be a 
resounding failure. Out of 14 municipalities that signed the financial restructuring contracts, only 5 
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reduced employment following the agreement, and all but 3 increased it again in subsequent years. 
The overall numbers thus remained practically unchanged, despite the fact that a few municipalities 
even obtained additional funds from central government to finance severance payments. In fact, at the 
end of 2014, local public administration had 10% more employees than in 2010, instead of 20% less as 
envisaged by the Government's plan (Figure 2). Either the importance of municipalities as the 
employers of last resort during lingering crisis, or the importance of public employment as a lever in 
the 2014 municipal elections, clearly prevented the central authorities from using their improved 
oversight powers to sanction such behaviour.  
The contracts did even less to reduce debt, apart from a small portion acquired by the 
Government in exchange for municipal property. Arrears continued to increase, and in 2015 another 
round of debt restructuring agreements was signed. Tax arrears of 14 municipalities worth around € 90 
million in total were rescheduled, to be paid off in the next 5-20 years, and 8 over-indebted 
municipalities received the permission, and government guarantees, to borrow another € 40 million 
from commercial banks to refinance other debt obligations (Government of Montenegro 2015d; 
2015e; 2015f; 2015c). It would thus appear that all these contracts accomplished was for the central 
government to circumvent its own rules on local debt ceilings, and push repayment deadlines further 
into the future. The only genuine "restructuring" in this period concerned local capital budgets: as the 
pressure to pay off accumulated debt obligations mounted, the spending on infrastructural investments 
practically ceased, in some cases even affecting regular maintenance work. Capital spending fell from 
around half of the budget expenditure at the peak to less than a quarter in 2013, whereas debt 
repayment grew to an average of 1/3 of all spending. 
 
Figure 3. Changes in the composition of local government expenditure, 2006-2013 
 
 
Walk before you run: EU assistance to local governments  
Compared to the ambitious, if never realised, decentralization plans and the exuberant investment 
campaign of the national government, the EU's own approach to regional development in Montenegro 
has been an object lesson in prudence. As in other accession countries, the first few years of the EU's 
involvement were marked by the same enthusiastic discourse about decentralization: the 2002-2006 
CARDS Strategy Paper on Montenegro (at the time still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) 
thus professed as one of its goals the support to decentralization and improved delivery of local 
services, and emphasised their link to such lofty objectives as greater democracy and fairness, the 
easing of inter-ethnic tensions and meeting more accurately the needs of the people (EC 2001, pp.48–
49).  However, the programmes that were actually implemented in the area of decentralization and 
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local government reform turned out to be – for good reason – conceptually and financially rather 
modest. 
It soon became obvious to EU experts that a comprehensive decentralization strategy was 
neither necessary nor possible, given the weak capacities of local governments in Montenegro, and the 
subsequent reports and action plans emphasised the "coherence and efficiency" of decentralization 
rather than its scope. Many of them also noted the lack of alignment between the systemic laws on 
local governments and their financing and the sectoral laws that often subverted these provisions, and 
called for a better clarification of responsibilities to allow for "oversight and transparency" (EC 2007, 
p.10). They also repeatedly urged improvements in human and administrative capacities as well as the 
capacities for financial management at the local level. 
These preoccupations were clearly reflected in the EU programmes directed at local 
governments in Montenegro. The amounts allocated through these support schemes remained rather 
small, and all of them included extensive training and capacity-building components to ensure that 
local governments could handle even these funds appropriately. The first such pilot project took place 
in the 2002-2004 period, under the management of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) 
CARDS programme. The EAR helped four municipalities to develop capital investment projects that 
could attract external funding and provided € 4.5 million for minor infrastructural undertakings to 
allow municipalities to "practice" EU-compatible project management skills. Another € 2.1 million 
from the funds dedicated to the public administration reform was invested in capacity-building 
projects for local authorities, including targeted technical and procurement advice to municipalities to 
enable them to attract and manage investments by international financial institutions (IFIs) (EC 2004).  
The transition to the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) changed little in the 
method of the EU's assistance to local governments in Montenegro; if anything, it became even more 
cautious. Compared to the language deployed in their CARDS predecessors, IPA documents are far 
less enthusiastic about decentralization, and instead emphasise the importance of enabling the local 
authorities to cope with the responsibilities they already have. The emphasis remained on capacity 
building, with small grants occasionally made available to finance selected municipal projects. The 
2008 IPA financing proposal for Montenegro thus earmarked € 7.05 million for local government 
reform, of which only about a half was to be used to support municipal infrastructure projects. The 
other half was dedicated to improving the legal framework governing decentralization, provide 
trainings to the Union of Municipalities, and upgrade local financial and investment planning, 
including teaching local authorities to prepare funding proposals for IFIs and conduct feasibility 
studies and impact analyses (EC 2008). In addition to providing all the necessary technical support to 
ensure its funds were properly managed, the EU also introduced a stronger ex-post supervision by 
insisting on a separate audit authority for IPA funds. 
The advantage of this approach was to ensure that the EU-funded projects largely remained 
free of the problems plaguing other investment enterprises by Montenegrin local authorities: 
unrealistic planning,  over-spending, and failures of implementation and oversight. However, as a way 
of preparing the country for the management of EU structural funds, it was also clearly impractical. 
Despite some improvements, Montenegrin municipalities remained incapable of managing large-scale 
projects on their own, and given the small size of the country most of such projects anyway cut across 
the municipal borders. Without a good coordination mechanism, the one attempt to create a "regional" 
project – a joint landfill for five northern municipalities – floundered due to the lack of cooperation 
(Ecorys 2013). To remedy this, the next round of financing for local government projects, launched in 
2011, invited exclusively joint projects in order to encourage bottom-up inter-municipal cooperation 
(EC 2011). 
Unfortunately, rather than a promising innovation in the EU's approach to regional 
development in Montenegro, this experiment with inter-municipal cooperation was also the last. From 
2012 onwards, all reference to decentralization disappeared from the EU documents and financing 
programmes for the country, and where local governments were mentioned it was only to complain of 
their lack of  transparency, efficiency and accountability14. The change in rhetoric from the earliest EU 
                                                      
14 This assessment repeats almost verbatim in all Progress Reports on Montenegro from 2012 to 2015. 
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strategy papers is striking: where the former treated local governments as vehicles of democratization 
and better governance, the latter appear to consider them borderline wasteful.  The 2015 Report on 
Montenegro thus singles out local governments as the main culprit for the country's failure to reduce 
employment in public administration, and expresses the hope that "since any new recruitment in local 
self-government is to be subject to approval by the Ministry of Finance, there may be a leaner and 
fiscally tighter public sector in Montenegro in the future, which in parallel ensures the necessary 
capacity and skills for European Integration (EC 2015, p.10). Although the findings of this paper 
suggest that such optimism is ill founded, this remark by the Commission illustrates well the renewed 
popularity of the conviction that centralization is both more efficient and more likely to bring the 
country in line with the enlargement objectives. 
 
Discussion: What kind of regional development policy for the enlargement countries? 
The change in attitude towards local governments as developmental actors described above is not a 
Montenegrin specialty – it is also reflected in a number broader changes to the EU support 
programmes for enlargement countries. First, the financing streams in the instrument for pre-accession 
assistance for the 2014-2020 period (IPA II) have been restructured so as to eliminate "regional 
development" as a separate component within the programme. The move may appear to be symbolic 
rather than substantive. After all, regional development has simply been disaggregated into the 
previously existing sub-components (transport, environment and competitiveness) and together with 
human resources development and agriculture bundled under a new "competitiveness and growth" 
heading. Nevertheless, the emphasis on sectoral, rather than the regional components of 
"competitiveness and growth" is indicative of the new way of thinking about development. More 
substantively, this restructuring also entailed a transfer of management responsibility for the 
programmes formerly falling under the purview of regional development from DG Regio to DG 
Enlargement, weakening the links to the EU cohesion policy and its regional emphasis. Second, IPA II 
also promised to shift from project-based financing, where each project was selected, approved and 
monitored either by the European Commission representatives or by EU-accredited bodies in the 
accession country to the so-called "sector budget support", in which the money is provided for broad 
policy objectives and managed by the recipient country at its discretion, as long as it promises to meet 
certain EU-approved benchmarks. This approach is meant to increase the beneficiaries' ownership of 
reforms and reduce the administrative burden on the Commission. However, it also means that the full 
responsibility for the policy implementation is given to the central authorities, and eliminates the kind 
of targeted support to local actors that has been the trademark of EU assistance so far. 
This paper has argued that abandoning the efforts to strengthen local developmental agency 
and calling for greater re-centralization would be a mistake. For one, the findings of this paper suggest 
that it is not decentralization as such, but the lack of accountability stemming from the ambiguous 
division of powers between levels of government that leads to soft budget constraints and fiscal 
opportunism. This is hardly news: two decades of research into the consequences of decentralization 
have confirmed that the institutional design matters (Rodden et al. 2003; Escolano et al. 2012; Daniels 
2016). However, most of this research focuses on the structure of incentives for local authorities, and 
the mechanisms to control moral hazard at the lower levels of government. The analysis of the 
Montenegrin case suggests that this perspective underestimates the temptation decentralization 
presents to central governments to "outsource" their fiscal responsibilities. Indeed, such strategies may 
not even require much formal decentralization; Montenegro, with its highly centralized institutional 
apparatus, is a good example of this. Examples from elsewhere in the region reveal even more creative 
ways of devolving financial responsibilities from the central government to other public and quasi-
public authorities: in Croatia, for instance, it is not the local governments, but the semi-corporatized 
local communal service companies that have been accumulating large amounts of debt (Bajo & 
Primorac 2010). If this is true, and the largest risk factor for fiscal imbalances at the local level are in 
fact the central governments, giving the central authorities more control and responsibility for fiscal 
stability is unlikely to bring the expected benefits, and may even be counterproductive.  
In fact, while the European Commission may have written off the Montenegrin local 
governments as potential partners in regional development policies, the national government seems as 
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eager as ever to continue relying on them, their dismal financial records notwithstanding. According to 
the 2015 Action Plan for Chapter 22 (Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments), the 
Government thus expects local authorities "to become the main beneficiaries of the EU Cohesion 
policy in Montenegro" (Government of Montenegro 2015b), although no institutional preconditions 
have been set up to make this expectation even remotely realistic. The government has repeatedly 
rejected the proposal of the Union of Municipalities to establish a stable co-financing fund, arguing 
that the current method of ad-hoc supplementary financing is sufficient. This is precisely the kind of 
mechanism that dilutes accountability and encourages soft budget constraints, and is also politically 
problematic as it leaves too much discretionary power to the central government. Combined with the 
change in EU financing strategy and the waning oversight of the European Commission, there is little 
reason to hope that this will bring either improved financial management or "the necessary capacity 
and skills for European Integration".  
A more promising strategy would be to strengthen the competencies as well as competences 
of local authorities, clearly delineating their developmental responsibilities and ensuring that they are 
capable of handling them. As could be seen from the experience of pre-accession assistance in the East 
Central European member states, this is not a simple task, and the results may well fall short of the 
Commission's expectations. Moreover, greater economic backwardness, institutional 
underdevelopment and the small scale of local government units in the Western Balkans might make 
this task even more onerous, as well as require a degree of innovation to adapt the EU's regional 
development policy to the new circumstances. Yet this is precisely the kind of state-building that has 
made the EU's enlargement policy one of the most successful developmental projects in the world 
(Bruszt & McDermott 2009). If the purpose of enlargement is to enact the deep institutional 
transformation that will truly prepare recipient countries for EU membership, then the weak 
capabilities of the subnational governments in the target states cannot be a good excuse to simply 
abandon them. 
 
  
EU Regional Development Policy 
15 
References 
Asatryan, Z., Feld, L.P. & Geys, B., 2015. Partial fiscal decentralization and sub-national government 
fiscal discipline: empirical evidence from OECD countries. Public Choice, 163(3-4), pp.307–
320. 
Bailey, D. & De Propris, L., 2002. EU Structural Funds, Regional Capabilities and Enlargement: 
Towards Multi-Level Governance? Journal of European Integration, 24(4), pp.303–324. 
Bajo, A. & Primorac, M., 2010. Local government borrowing practice in Croatia. Financial Theory 
and Practice, 34(4), pp.379–406. 
Bartlett, W. & Šišević, B., 2013. Regional Policy and Decentralization in Montenegro. In Bartlett, W. 
Malekovic, S. Monastiriotis, V. Decentralization and Local Dvelopment in South East Europe. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 67–79. 
Bird, R.M., Ebel, R.D. & Wallich, C. eds., 1995. Decentralization of the socialist state: 
intergovernmental finance in transition economies, Washington, D.C: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. 
Bohle, D., 2015. Subnational Debt Crises, International Conditionality, and the Rise and Demise of 
Local Democracy in Weimar Germany and Post-Socialist Hungary. In 22nd International 
Conference of Europeanists, 8-10 June 2010. Paris: Council for European Studies, Columbia 
University. 
Börzel, T.A., 2002. States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany 
and Spain, Cambridge University Press. 
Breton, A., 1998. Competitive governments: an economic theory of politics and public finance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bruszt, L., 2008. Multi-level Governance—the Eastern Versions: Emerging Patterns of Regional 
Developmental Governance in the New Member States. Regional & Federal Studies, 18(5), 
pp.607–627. 
Bruszt, L. & McDermott, G.A., 2009. Transnational Integration Regimes as Development 
Programmes. In Bruszt, László; Holzhacker, Ronald (eds.) The Transnalization of Economies, 
States and Civil Societies. New York: Springer, pp. 23–61. 
Bruszt, L. & Vedres, B., 2013. Associating, mobilizing, politicizing: local developmental agency from 
without. Theory and Society, 42(1), pp.1–23. 
Burki, S.J. et al., 1999. Beyond the center - decentralizing the State, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
CBCG, 2011. Central Bank of Montenegro Annual Report 2010. 
Colino, C., Molina, I. & Hombrado, A., 2014. Responding to the New Europe and the Crisis: The 
Adaptation of Sub-national Governments’ Strategies and its Effects on Inter-governmental 
Relations in Spain. Regional & Federal Studies, 24(3), pp.281–299. 
Dan, 2015. Ministarstvo u klin, Jovanka u ploču. Daily newspaper “Dan.” Podgorica, 03 June 2015 
Daniels, L. von, 2016. Fiscal decentralization and budget control, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
EC, 2004. CARDS Action Programme 2004 for Montenegro. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/montenegro_ap_2
004_en.pdf. 
EC, 2001. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, European 
Commission, External Relations Directorate General. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/fry_strategy_paper
_en.pdf. 
EC, 2008. Financing Proposal for the National Programme for Montenegro under the IPA - Transition 
Assistance and Institution Building Component - for 2008. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/montenegro/ipa/2008/national_programme_montenegro_2
008_en.pdf. 
EC, 2007. Montenegro 2007 Progress Report, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. 
EC, 2015. Montenegro 2015 Report, Brussels: European Commission. 
Vera Šćepanović 
16 
EC, 2011. National Programme for Montenegro under the IPA Transition Assistance and Institution 
Building Component for the Year 2011. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/montenegro/ipa/2011/annex_cid_ipa_me_2011.pdf. 
Ecorys, 2013. IPA - interim evaluation and meta-  evaluation of IPA assistance, Rotterdam: ECORYS 
Nederland BV. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/phare/evaluation/2013/ipa_interim_m
eta_evaluation_report.pdf. 
Escolano, J. et al., 2012. Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European 
Union Countries, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Government of Montenegro, 2002. Economic Reform Agenda for Montenegro 2002-2007, Podgorica. 
Government of Montenegro, 2014a. Informacija o daljoj realizaciji Projekta vodosnadbijevanja i 
odvođenja otpadnih voda u Crnoj Gori, koji se finansira iz sredstava Evropske investicione 
banke (EIB), za potrebe realizacije Projekta izgradnje postrojenja za preĉišćavanje otpadnih 
voda u Nikšiću. (Information on the further implementation of the Project of water supply and 
waste water management in Montenegro, financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
for the purpose of implementation of the Project Construction of Waste Water Treatment Plant 
in Nikšić). 94th session of the Government of Montenegro, 18 December 2014 (item 39). 
Available at: http://www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/94 
Government of Montenegro, 2015a. Informacija o realizaciji komunalnih infrastrukturnih projekata 
koji se finansiraju iz sredstava međunarodnih finansijskih institucija (Information on the 
implementation of communal infrastructure projects financed by loans from international 
financial institutions). 112nd session of the Government of Montenegro, 14 May 2015 (Item 
5). Available at: http://www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/112 
Government of Montenegro, 2015b. Predlog Akcionog plana za ispunjavanje zahtjeva u oblasti 
kohezione politike EU. (Draft Action Plan for the implementation of committments under EU 
Cohesion Policy). 125th session of the Government of Montenegro, 3 September 2015 (Item 
4). Available at: www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/125 
Government of Montenegro, 2015c. Zaključak o prihvatanju izdavanja državne garancije na kreditno 
zaduženje Opštine Bijelo Polje u iznosu od 2.500.000,00 eura. (Conclusions on the issuing of 
the state guarantee for the loan of the Municipality of Bijelo Polje worth 2.500.000,00 euro). 
140th session of the Government of Montenegro, 17 December 2015 (Item 36.) Available at: 
http://www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/140 
Government of Montenegro, 2015d. Zaključak o usvajanju Informacije o reprogramu duga opština. 
(Conclusion on the adoption of the Information on municipal debt reprogramming, 100th 
session of the Government of Montenegro, 19 February 2015 (Item 10). Available at: 
http://www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/100. 
Government of Montenegro, 2014b. Zaključak o usvajanju Informacije o stanju javnih finansija i broju 
zaposlenih na lokalnom nivou (Conclusion on the adoption of the Information on the state of 
public finances and number of employees at the local level), 92nd session of the Government 
of Montenegro, 4 December 2014 (Item 13). Available at: 
http://www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/92 
Government of Montenegro, 2015e. Zaključci sa 133. sjednice Vlade Crne Gore. (Conclusions from 
the 133rd seating of the Government of Montenegro), Podgorica: Vlada Crne Gore. Available 
at: http://www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/133. 
Government of Montenegro, 2015f. Zaključci sa 139. sjednice Vlade Crne Gore. (Conclusions from 
the 139th seating of the Government of Montenegro), Podgorica: Vlada Crne Gore. Available 
at: http://www.gov.me/sjednice_vlade/139. 
Hughes, J. et al., 2004. Europeanization and regionalization in the EU’s enlargement to Central and 
Eastern Europe - The myth of conditionality, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
ICMA, 2002. US-Montenegro Partnership for Municipal Development Quarterly Progress Report, 
International City/County Management Association. 
EU Regional Development Policy 
17 
IMF, 2013. Montenegro 2013 Article IV Consultation, Washington, D.C: International Monetary 
Fund. 
Marović, J., 2014. Local Self-Governments and Public-Private Partnership, Podgorica: Institute 
Alternative, Centre for Civic Education. 
Mojsovska, S., 2011. Decentralization and Regional Policy in the Republic of Macedonia: 
Developments and Perspectives, London School of Economics and Political Science Research 
on South Eastern Europe. 
Municipality of Budva, 2011. Odluka o budžetu Opštine Budva za 2011. godinu (Decision on the 2011 
budget of the Municipality of Budva). 
Municipality of Nikšić, 2014. Odluka o budžetu opštine Nikšić za 2015. godinu (Decision on the 
Budget of the Municipality of Nikšić for the zear 2015). Available at: http://niksic.me/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/budzet_2015-Odluka.doc. 
NALAS, 2012. Fiscal Decentralization Indicators for South East Europe Report, Skopje: Network of 
Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe (NALAS). 
NALAS, 2010. Guidelines on Local Government Borrowing and Recent Developments in NALAS 
Countries, Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe. 
Oates, W.E., 1972. Fiscal federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Parliament of Montenegro, 2015. Izvještaj sa kontrolnog saslušanja na temu “Sprovođenje politike, 
odnosno zakona u oblasti koncesija” (Report from the parliamentary hearing on the topic 
“Implementation of the policy and law on concessions,” Podgorica: Skupština Crne Gore, 
Odbor za ekonomiju, finansije i budžet. 
Pradelli, J. et al., 2015. Montenegro: Options to restore fiscal sustainability and improve spending 
effiiency at subnational level, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Rodden, J., Eskeland, G.S. & Litvack, J.I. eds., 2003. Fiscal decentralization and the challenge of 
hard budget constraints, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
RTB, 2010a. Opština se zadužila za 58 miliona. Radio Televizija Budva. Available at: 
http://www.rtvbudva.me/vijesti/opstina-se-zaduzila-za-58-miliona/2426. 
RTB, 2010b. Poništena odluka o zaduženju, nastavak zasijedanja u srijedu. Radio Televizija Budva. 
Available at: http://www.rtvbudva.me/vijesti/novi-kredit-prezaduzene-opstine/2421. 
State Audit Institution, 2015. Izvještaj o reviziji Završnog računa budžeta Opštine Budva za 2014. 
godinu. Available at: 
http://www.dri.co.me/1/doc/Izvje%C5%A1taj%20o%20reviziji%20Zavr%C5%A1nog%20ra
%C4%8Duna%20bud%C5%BEeta%20Op%C5%A1tine%20Budva%20za%202014.%20godi
nu.pdf. 
TFEU, 2012. Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Official Journal of the European 
Union, C326(49). 
UNECE, 2015. Montenegro Third Environmental Performance Review, New York; Geneva: United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
UNECE, 2003. Yugoslavia Environmental Performance Review, New York; Geneva: United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, Committee on Environmental Policy. 
Union of Municipalities of Montenegro, 2013. Analiza stanja u finansiranju lokalnih samouprava 
(Analysis of the state of financing of local self-governments)., Podgorica: Zajednica opština 
Crne Gore, Komisija za finansiranje lokalne samouprave. 
World Bank, 2005. Serbia and Montenegro - Republic of Montenegro : economic memorandum - a 
policy for growth and competitiveness, Washington D.C.: World Bank. Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6408013/serbia-montenegro-republic-
montenegro-economic-memorandum-policy-growth-competitiveness. 
 
 

  
 
